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Abstract
The search for the statistical mechanical underpinning of thermodynamic
irreversibility has so far focussed on the spontaneous approach to equilibrium. But this is
the search for the underpinning of what Brown and Uffink (2001) have dubbed the ‘minus
first law’ of thermodynamics. In contrast, the second law tells us that certain interventions
on equilibrium states render the initial state ‘irrecoverable’. In this paper, I discuss the
unusual nature of processes in thermodynamics, and the type of irreversibility that the
second law embodies. I then search for the microscopic underpinning or statistical
mechanical ‘reductive basis’ of the second law of thermodynamics by taking a
functionalist strategy. First, I outline the functional role of the thermodynamic entropy:
for a thermally isolated system, the thermodynamic entropy is constant in quasi-static
processes, but increasing in non-quasi-static processes. I then search for the statistical
mechanical quantity that plays this role — rather than the role of the traditional ‘holy
grail’ as described by Callender (1999). I argue that in statistical mechanics, the Gibbs
entropy plays this role.
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1 Introduction
‘The second law is one of the all-time great laws of science, for it illuminates why anything —
anything from the cooling of hot matter to the formulation of a thought — happens at all’, or
so claims Atkins (2007, preface). Yet controversy clouds the second law of thermodynamics
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(TDSL). Whilst Snow (1959) famously said that an acquaintance with the second law is the
scientific equivalent of having read a work of Shakespeare, Uffink (2001) discusses important
nuances about the content of the TDSL. Further philosophical questions abound: Can the
second law provide the naturalistic basis for the arrow of time, as Reichenbach (1956)
thought? Can Maxwell’s demon get its claws into it? But the most controversial question is
how to find the microphysical underpinning of the second law. Addressing this latter question
is my project in this paper.
This project is one of inter-theoretic reduction: the goal is to capture the behaviour
described by one theory —thermodynamics (TD) — in terms of another theory —- statistical
mechanics (SM). However, in what follows, my argument will not hang on the fine-grained
details of any single account of reduction.1 Nonetheless, I will, in section 2, emphasise how
functionalism is useful for securing reductions. Under this functionalist lens, the goal
becomes to find a SM realiser of the TD role. Much of the controversy resides in defining the
correct role in a given case, and defining the TDSL role will form the heart of my argument.
Indeed, if the idiom of functionalism is off-putting to the reader, the key argument can still be
understood if you skip section 2 and read ‘realiser’ as ‘reductive basis’.2
In section 3 I discuss the unusual nature of processes in TD. In section 3.4, following Uffink
(2013), I describe three different types of irreversibility. Then, in section 4, I introduce the
TDSL, and show how it implicitly defines the TD entropy, and codifies its behaviour.
In section 5, I articulate the role of TD entropy: for thermally isolated systems, S T D is
constant in quasi-static processes but increasing in non-quasi-static processes. In section 5.2, I
emphasise how this role differs from the ‘holy grail’ — a non-decreasing function to call
entropy, as outlined by Callender (1999). In section 6, I then search for the realiser of this role
in quantum statistical mechanics, and I argue that the Gibbs entropy plays this role. But the
1Indeed, contending with the controversies of limits in reduction cf. Batterman (1995), or
the nature of bridge laws cf. Sklar (1993) would leave no time for the main event.
2One caveat to this: one of my two replies to the objection to the Gibbs entropy relies on
functionalism (section 7.1). Those allergic to functionalism can rely on the second reply in
section 7.3.
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Gibbs entropy has been criticised for its ‘ensemble’ nature, in section 7 I defend the Gibbs
entropy, before concluding in section 8.
2 Functionalism: a tool for reduction
Functionalism — the view that ‘to be X is just to play the X-role’ — has risen to prominence
in the philosophy of physics (e.g. Albert (2013), Wallace (2012, Ch. 2), Knox (2013)). For
example, Knox (2013) advocates functionalism about spacetime; to be spacetime is just to
play the spacetime role, that is: to pick out the inertial trajectories. The motivation for
advocating functionalism in this, and other cases, is to understand inter-theory relations. As
such, spacetime functionalism is used to compare spacetimes across different physical
theories. If a theory of quantum gravity is ‘non-spatiotemporal’, prima facie it is difficult to
see how general relativity (GR) can be reduced to this theory (or, in the physicists’ idiom, how
GR can be recovered from this theory). But the functionalist reminds us that spacetime need
not be fundamental in a theory of quantum gravity (Lam 2018). Instead, we need only capture
the relevant behaviour described by general relativity. That is, we only need to find something
in a theory of quantum gravity that behaves, i.e. plays the role, of spacetime.
Functionalism makes behaviour centre stage, and it is ‘the behaviour characteristic of the
system [that] is the focus of reduction’ (Rueger 2006, p. 343) (see also Rosaler (2019, p.
273)). Provided that real behaviour can be modelled by both theories, other differences may
not matter. In this way, functionalism helps emphasise that there might be differences between
the theory to be reduced Tt and the reducer Tb. Consequently, functionalism is useful as a
strategy for overcoming scepticism about certain instances of reduction.
To a certain extent, the same point can be made in the Nagel-Schaffner account, in which
only an approximation or ‘close cousin’, T ∗t , of the original theory Tt, must be deduced from
Tb (Butterfield 2011a;b). However, understanding approximations is a notoriously thorny
issue: in which ways are Tt and T ∗t allowed to differ? One might think that the difference
should be minimised — but in certain cases this could lead the reductive project astray. For
instance, in the thermodynamic limit, the probabilistic fluctuations of SM disappear, and the
categorical nature of quantities regained, as is familiar from TD. Thus, in the limit the SM
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description is closer to the original TD description. But bringing in the thermodynamic limit
obscures the reduction (if indeed limits are allowed in Nagelian bridge laws, cf. Butterfield
(2011a;b)), since no actual system is infinite. Moreover, in what follows, the thermodynamic
limit is not required to consider the reduction of the TDSL (notably, unlike the case of phase
transitions, cf. Batterman (2001), Ardourel (2018), Palacios (2019)).
Functionalism has the upper hand here as it specifies the differences that can be tolerated:
the realiser can differ in ways that do not affect its playing the functional role. ‘Being locked’
is a functional property: it can be realised by various mechanisms — D-locks, padlocks,
combination locks etc. These various mechanisms differ in many ways, such as their colour or
whether a key is required, but these differences do not prevent them from playing the
functional role.
Returning to the arena of thermal physics, here is an example of how functionalism can help
overcome skepticism about reduction. Sklar raises the following concern: the ‘temperature
equals mean molecular kinetic energy’ bridge law identifies a fundamentally non-statistical
quantity with a fundamentally statistical quantity. How is this supposed to work?’ (Sklar
1993, p.161) as quoted by Batterman (2010).
Sklar’s worry is that mean kinetic energy and temperature have different features: the
former is statistical and latter not, and thus this blocks the reduction. But if the non-statistical
nature of temperature is not part of its functional role, then the same behaviour can be
captured by a statistical property: provided they have the same relevant behaviour, and so
mean kinetic energy plays the functional role of temperature in an ideal gas.
Of course, this then raises the question: should the non-statistical nature be a part of the
functional role of TD temperature? Here I submit that the purely philosophical doctrine of
functionalism is silent: only detailed engagement with the physical theory at hand will answer
the question. Thus, substantive work in advocating functionalism in philosophy of physics is
spelling out the functional roles (and this is what I do for TDSL in the first half of this paper).
But, in particular case studies, cashing out which differences matter and which don’t will be
very controversial. To return to Sklar’s example, being a statistical rather than non-statistical
property could be a difference that does not matter, if, for example, the functional role of
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temperature is to be a quantity that is numerically identical for two systems in mutual
equilibrium. But in the case of spacetime, there is controversy over the correct functional role,
cf. Knox (2019), Baker (2018), Read and Menon (2019).
In this way, functionalism is a useful strategy for considering, but not a solution to, vexed
questions of reduction. Functionalism frames the debate, but doesn’t singlehandedly resolve
it.3
Whilst there are no in-principle restrictions about to which theories the functionalist
strategy can be applied4, thermodynamics lends itself especially naturally to a functionalist
perspective, as suggested by Sklar (1999): ‘In thermodynamics the concept of entropy is
defined solely by its function in the theory. We have no direct phenomenal sense of entropy,
nor are there devices that serve as direct entropy measurers’ (Sklar 1999, p. 195), and so
‘something akin to functionalist accounts of mental concepts is appealing’ (Sklar 1999, p.
191). This is because many of its core arguments and notions, such as the Carnot cycle, are
very abstract. Thermodynamic systems are described by only a few parameters and the
microscopic details are purposefully not considered. As such, functional commonality amid
diversity in the microstructure is a theme in thermodynamics — which is conducive to taking
3Consequently, I do not take functionalism to be a necessary component to reduction,
contra Kim (1998; 1999). Naturally, there is a substantive project to connect functionalism in
philosophy of physics to philosophy of mind, but these issues are not central to my project
here. Causal roles are central to philosophy of mind, but seem inappropriate in physics (cf.
Russell (1913), Norton (2009), Frisch (2014)). But independently of this, Kim’s account faces
problems: for example, see Rueger (2006) for an argument that the two quantities in question
Xt and Xb will generally have different causal profiles.
4Lewis’ approach to theoretical terms shows that all concepts in science can be considered
to be functional concepts, (Lewis 1970). This formal point has an informal counterpart:
‘Functionalism is the idea enshrined in the old proverb: handsome is as handsome does.
Matter matters only because of what matter can do. Functionalism in this broadest sense is so
ubiquitous in science that it is tantamount to a reigning presumption of all science’ (Dennett
2001, p.233).
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functionalist approach, since it echoes the slogan in philosophy of mind that ‘functional
commonality trumps physical diversity’ (Levin 2018).
To sum up: If the higher-level concepts are functional role concepts, then the realiser just
has to play the same role, i.e. have the same behaviour. Consequently, certain differences
between the quantities of Tt and Tb that one might worry block reduction — might not matter.
Next I consider some important features of the theory to be reduced: thermodynamics.
3 The nature of thermodynamic ‘processes’
Often a physical theory has two components: the kinematics and the dynamics. The
kinematics specify the state-space: the possible states of the system. The kinematic
component of thermodynamics is clear: in section 3.1, I describe the equilibrium state-space. I
then consider the ‘dynamics’ in ‘thermodynamics’. Usually, the evolution of a physical
system is determined by the theory’s equations of motion and its evolution can be represented
by a curve through state-space parametrised by time. But this familiar situation is alien to
thermodynamics. Thermodynamics is not a dynamical theory. Indeed, one might think that
‘thermostatics’ would be a more appropriate name. There are no equations of motion and no
explicit time parameter. Furthermore, it is hard to see how a curve in an equilibrium
state-space could represent any dynamical process, let alone which direction this process
would occur. In section 3.2, I consider how any processes are possible at all, and then, in
section 3.3, I discuss curves in equilibrium state-space. I discuss the sense in which they are
reversible, and in section 3.4 I outline three types of time-asymmetry in thermal physics.
3.1 Equilibrium state-space
The state-space of thermodynamics, Ξ, is the space of equilibrium states, parametrised by two
or more macrovariables. For a gas, the points of Ξ can be labelled by pressure and volume
(p, V); for a film, they are labelled by surface tension and area; for a magnet, magnetic field
and magnetization; and for a dielectric, electric field and polarization (e.g. Tong (2012, §4)).
Thermodynamic equilibrium states are states in which the macrovariables no longer vary in
time: the system (as described by thermodynamics) will sit there indefinitely. Naturally, the
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absolute nature of thermodynamic equilibrium is an idealisation.5 Nevertheless, the key point
is that we get away with treating a system as if it were in thermodynamic, i.e. absolute,
equilibrium (at least: for the cases where TD is empirically successful.)
Equilibrium is at the heart of thermodynamics, and it is a presupposition of the theory that
systems will end up in equilibrium. Because this requirement that systems do in fact reach
equilibrium is prior to the other laws, Brown and Uffink (2001) call it the ‘minus first law’ (but
they also suggest that it is so central that the name ‘the minus infinite law’ is also appropriate
(Brown and Uffink 2001, p. 529)).
The Minus First Law: An isolated system in an arbitrary initial state within a finite fixed
volume will spontaneously attain a unique state of equilibrium (Brown and Uffink 2001, p.
528).
Figure 1: The equilibrium state-space Ξ appropriate for an ideal gas. The co-ordinates (P1, V1)
label point x1 and (P2, V2) label point x2.
3.2 Interventions
By the very definition of an equilibrium state, once a system reaches such a state (and so is
represented by a point x1: (p1, V1) such as in Figure 1), it will remain there indefinitely — it
5Features of the underlying theories suggest that a system won’t stay in equilibrium
forever. For example, Poincaré recurrence suggests that systems will eventually return to
earlier states. Furthermore, to take an example from (Wallace 2015, ft. 1): at room
temperature, hydrogen and oxygen appear to be in equilibrium with one another, but if you
strike a match, we see the system change dramatically: that equilibrium, also, wasn’t forever.
8
cannot spontaneously move to another state, x2: (p2, V2). Thus, for any change or process to
occur, there must be an intervention on the system: e.g. inserting a partition, squeezing with a
piston, placing the system in thermal contact with a heat bath or slowly varying a magnetic
field (cf. Wallace (2014, p. 699)).
These are interventions on the system by external systems (that need not be agents in any
thick sense). These interventions alter external parameters such as volume, or magnetisation
— variables that would otherwise be unchanging for a system in thermal equilibrium.6
But if such interventions knock the system out of equilibrium, then its state is no longer
represented in TD state-space, Ξ. However, the minus first law says that once the external
parameter is no longer changing, the system will return to a — perhaps, new — equilibrium
state.
To illustrate this, consider the following example: the Joule free expansion of a gas. The
system is initially in equilibrium state x1, represented by the point (p1, V1) in Figure 1. The
partition is removed and the gas rapidly expands in an uncontrolled manner. After some short
time, the gas settles down to a new equilibrium state, x2, with a larger volume. Only the initial
and final states of this process are represented in Ξ: thermodynamics is silent on what happens
away from equilibrium. Therefore, Figure 1, but not Figure 2, represents the Joule expansion.
3.3 Curves: quasi-static processes
Considering a curve through the equilibrium state-space Ξ raises interpretational issues.
Figure 2 shows an undirected, continuous curve from point x1 to point x2. How can such a set
of points represent any process? Any intervention will knock the system out of equilibrium —
6Wallace (2014) uses the terminology ‘control theory’, and similar themes run throughout
the foundational literature. Lavis (2018) discusses a similar control theory view, but in terms
of adiabatic accessibility. Myrvold (2011) discusses Maxwell’s means-relative view of
thermodynamics, whereby certain quantities are relative to an agent’s means. In the context of
quantum theory, ‘resource’ theory views of thermodynamics are popular (Horodecki and
Oppenheim 2013). I believe that these foundational views bring out what is already implicit in
traditional presentations of thermodynamics: interventions are required.
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Figure 2: A curve through the above equilibrium state-space Ξ.
indeed, this is required for anything to happen. And we can’t just ignore this problem.
Although many processes in TD are like the Joule free expansion (i.e. will not be represented
by such curves), much of thermodynamics involves examining curves through Ξ.7
But how should we consider such curves? This question has been at the heart of a recent
controversy. In what follows, I outline the common thread to the three main recent papers on
this controversy: Norton (2016), Lavis (2018), Valente (2017), who openly admit that there is
not a vast difference between their resolutions.8
First, all agree no actual system will trace out the curve spontaneously. Hence, Tatiana
Ehrenfest-Afanassjewa called these curves ‘quasi-processes’ to emphasise that they are
unphysical, mathematical constructs (Ehrenfest-Afanassjewa 1925; 1956). But the orthodoxy
is that we can make a series of very small interventions to external parameters, and the system
will then arrive at a new, neighbouring equilibrium state without ever straying ‘too far’ from
equilibrium. The orthodoxy is that intervening ‘gently’ or ‘slowly enough’ will ensure this
closeness to equilibrium.9
7In particular, a common strategy is to integrate the small changes in parameters such as
p, V along such curves to find new thermodynamic quantities, especially ones which are
path-independent. This allows us to talk of the changes in the values of these quantities even
in processes such as the Joule expansion — which involves the non-equilibrium goings-on of
which TD is silent.
8For example: ‘Granted, the two proposals do not seem to differ too much from each other
’ (Valente 2017, p. 1777), and ‘the work of this paper has similarities with that of Norton
(2016)’ (Lavis 2018, p. 137).
9Of course, there is an undesirable vagueness in the claim that the system is not ‘too far’
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Why is it assumed that performing the interventions slowly enough will help the system
stay close to equilibrium? Equilibrium requires that the macroparameters are not changing in
time. By perturbing the system slowly — e.g. inserting the piston slowly — the
macroparameters won’t change very quickly, and so the system will not be too far from
equilibrium. But how should we evaluate ‘fast’? Fast compared to what? There is no global,
nor a priori answer, but to give a rough idea: in the case of the ‘slow insertion’ of the piston to
intervene on the volume, the time taken to make a small change dV should be long compared
to the timescale over which the molecules bounce between the piston and the wall. In this
case, the process the system undergoes is a good approximation to that represented by the
curve. The smaller the intervention the better this approximation that the curve represents the
process occurring. But no actual process is perfectly represented by the curve. In the limit of
smaller and slower interventions, nothing happens —- there is no ‘process’. Rather the curve
delimits or is the ‘common frontier’ (Lavis 2018, p. 139) of the set of sequences of processes,
which approximate the quasi-static process. Thus, the term ‘quasi-static’ properly denotes a
set of processes, whose sequence heads in the direction of the common frontier — the curve in
Ξ — but never meets it.10
The bare curve can become a directed curve — the curve can be traversed in either
direction, but different interventions are required for each direction. To travel in one direction
pistons must be inserted, and in the other direction they must be removed. There is one further
condition that must be mentioned: in order that a process can proceed in either direction, and
so retrace its steps, there must be no friction (e.g. in the piston). Thus, standardly friction is
excluded, cf. Tong (2012, p. 113), Uffink (2001, p. 365), Blundell and Blundell (2009, p.
from equilibrium. How far is too far? There is no satisfying answer to this question. As
Valente (2017) notes, it is hard to make this precise: we can’t appeal to a topology over
non-equilibrium states to establish that they are close enough to equilibrium, since they are not
described by TD. Instead —as is common with approximations— whether the system is ‘close
enough’ is an empirical matter. Indeed, Afanassjewa-Ehrenfest’s view is that we need an
‘empirically grounded concept of “close enough to equilibrium” ’ (Valente 2017, p. 1777).
10Norton (2016) and Lavis (2018) emphasise that Duhem (1902, p. 78) has a similar
approach.
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Figure 3: Quasi-static reversible processes represented in the p-V plane of equilibrium states.
120).11
Because the curve can be transversed in either direction (for example, in the Carnot cycle in
Figure 3 the arrows can be drawn in either direction), there is a sense in which it is
‘reversible’. But, next I note that there are different concepts of reversibility.
3.4 Concepts of Irreversibility
Before examining the TDSL, it is important to unravel the different concepts of reversibility.
Uffink (2013) outlines three concepts of ‘reversibility’ in thermal physics:
1. Time-reversal invariance (TRI): there exists a map T — frequently assumed to be the
map t 7→ −t — that maps possible histories of the system to possible histories.
2. Quasi-static reversible processes: we previously saw that curves in TD state-space
represent quasi-static processes, and are reversible in the sense that the arrows can be
drawn in either direction on the curves in Figure 3: corresponding to expansions and
compressions. But travelling in one direction is not straightforwardly the ‘time reverse’
in the TRI t → −t sense: one is not performing the same interventions in a different
order, but rather performing different interventions (e.g. inserting rather than removing a
piston). Furthermore, as previously discussed, this ‘quasi-static reversibility’ is a
property of a sequence of processes, rather than of a single process.
11In the First law, writing that d¯W = pdV requires that there is ‘no friction or hysteresis’
(Uffink 2001, p. 365).
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The name given to this type of reversibility by Clausius and Planck is ‘umkehrbar’
(Uffink 2001, p. 343), a word for reversibility with connotations of ‘unwinding’. Part of
the idealisation of quasi-static (or umkehrbar) processes in thermodynamics is that there
is no friction, or dissipation, so that the curve can be transversed in either direction. But,
outside the context of thermal physics, a quasistatic process needn’t be time-reversible
at all. For example, discharge of a condenser through high resistance can be forced to
happen very slowly, but nonetheless it is clearly an irreversible process (Uffink 2013, p.
277).
However, for the rest of this paper, we will stick to the usage in thermal physics;
’quasi-static processes’ will denote the reversible processes represented by curves in Ξ
discussed in the previous section, which exclude friction.
3. Recoverability: the process in question can be ‘fully undone’. The system can be
returned to its initial state Ki with no effect in the environment E. But the system need
not retrace its steps — it can take a different path to its destination.12 So process P is
recoverable, if: writing 〈Ki, Ei〉 P−→ 〈K f , E f 〉 there is a process P∗ such that
〈K f , E f 〉 P∗−−→ 〈Ki, Ei〉.
Having distinguished the different types of reversibility in thermal physics, we now turn to
what is often claimed to be the source of irreversibility: the second law.
4 The Second Law Introduced
There are many statements of the TDSL (see Uffink (2001) for the relationships between
them). One classic formulation of the TDSL is the Kelvin statement: ‘it is impossible to
perform a cyclic process with no other result than that heat is absorbed from a reservoir, and
work is performed’ (Kelvin (1882) as cited in (Uffink, 2001, p.328)). In this section, I show
how the TDSL and the reversible quasi-static processes discussed in the previous section are
12Luczak (2018) adds the further condition that the process P∗ must be one that we can
implement — this is part of the Maxwellian view, which I cannot discuss further here but see
Myrvold (2011).
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used to define the thermodynamic entropy S T D, and codify its behaviour.
The starting point is a formulation of the TDSL, known as the Carnot theorem (Blundell
and Blundell 2009, p. 130). Carnot’s theorem states that the Carnot cycle in Figure 3 (which
operates between two reservoirs, one at a temperature Th and the other at lower temperature
Tc) is the most efficient, i.e. the best we can do, and so the efficiency η =
Qh
Qc
is the same for
all reversible engines, where Qh is the heat absorbed in the isothermal expansion A− B and Qc
is the heat emitted in the isothermal compression C − D. (See Clausius (1879, p. 80) for an
argument that the efficiency is independent of the substance considered).
In a Carnot cycle:
Σ2i=1
Qi
Ti
= 0. (4.1)
This can be generalised to an arbitrary quasi-static reversible cycle in the equilibrium
state-space Ξ, as shown in Figure 4.
Figure 4: This diagram shows the original Carnot cycle, as well as another smaller Carnot cycle,
EBGFE. By cutting more corners, i.e. by having many infinitesimal adiabats and isotherms, any
quasi-static reversible cycle in the plane can be considered.
In this case, ∮
d¯Q
T
= 0. (4.2)
Thus, if there are two (or more) reversible paths (i.e. quasi-static curves) between
equilibrium state A and equilibrium state B the change in
∫ B
A
d¯Q
T is independent of the path
taken. (See Figure 5).
This (along with a reference state 0) allows us to the define a new function of state which
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Figure 5: Two possible paths between two states in Ξ. Figure from Tong (2012).
only depends on the state variables p, V : the thermodynamic entropy S T D.
∫ B
0
d¯Q
T
= S T D(B) (4.3)
Because entropy S T D is a function of state, it is path-independent: it doesn’t matter how we
reached state B — quasi-statically or not, or whether the system was isolated or not — either
way the entropy of state B is S (B).13
Clausius’ inequality generalises away from the quasi-static reversible cycle above to any
cycle: ∮
d¯Q
T
6 0 (4.4)
∮
d¯Q
T
=
∫
1
d¯Q
T
−
∫
2
d¯Q
T
6 0. (4.5)
If path 1 is not quasi-static and path 2 is a quasi-static path from state A to B, and path 1 is
adiabatic (so d¯Q = 0), then we learn that the thermodynamic entropy of a thermally isolated
system cannot decrease:
S T D(B) − S T D(A) > 0. (4.6)
13The Third law is needed to set the convention that at absolute zero, the entropy is zero, but
since the third law is controversial (cf. Wald (1997), Masanes and Oppenheim (2017)), I leave
it aside here.
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From the quasi-static reversible curves in equilibrium state space, we’ve defined a new state
function S T D, and shown that for thermally isolated systems, if a process P is a quasi-static
reversible process then ∆S T D = 0, and if P is non-quasi-static, then ∆S T D > 0.
4.1 What type of irreversibility does the TDSL describe?
The second law describes the irrecoverability of certain initial states — if the process P (in
section 3.4’s definition) is a non-quasi-static process. As such the Clausius relation provides a
bridge from umkehrbar or quasi-static reversible processes to the definition of irrecoverability.
Generally, since irrecoverability is a modal notion, it requires we consult all possible
processes to establish whether there exists a process P∗ that takes 〈K f , E f 〉 P∗−−→ 〈Ki, Ei〉. Thus,
determining whether P is recoverable is an epistemic challenge. But in the case of TD, the
challenge is lessened, since the signature of irrecoverability is that there will be an increase in
S T D associated to the thermally isolated system.
Both concepts, recoverability and quasi-staticity, are central to the TDSL, but it is
irrecoverability that captures the imagination. Irrecoverability seems like a widespread
phenomenon: our inability to recapture lost youth, smashed wine glasses or split milk
exemplifies the irrecoverability of these processes. But there’s an open question whether we
can assign a thermodynamic entropy S T D to these processes, since it is unclear that there’s an
equilibrium state space description available, or there are the relevant quasi-static processes
available. And in defining S T D, we relied on quasi-static processes. Uffink emphasises their
importance: ‘if such processes did not exist then the entropy difference between these two
states would not be defined’ (Uffink 2006, p. 938)14, adding that ‘this warning that the
increase of entropy is thus conditional on the existence of quasi-static transitions has been
pointed out already by Kirchhoff (1894, p. 69)’, as cited in (Uffink 2006, p. 938).15 In a
14Of course, as discussed earlier, quasi-static processes only exist in the sense of being the
limit of set of actual processes we can implement. But this is all that is needed to calculate
various quantities, namely: d¯QT — we don’t need to be able to implement a perfect quasi-static
process — as Norton (2016) emphasises, this is impossible!
15This casts doubt over Atkin’s bold claim that the second law is responsible for a vast
range of processes, including the ‘formation of a thought’, as quoted at the opening of this
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nutshell, it is unclear thermodynamics applies to these everyday examples of irrecoverability
in anything other than a metaphorical sense.
Of course, since S T D is a state function (a path independent quantity), the entropy change
during a non-quasi-static process is well-defined. But quasi-static processes are required to
calculate ∆S T D, and define it in the first place. Furthermore, adiabatic quasi-static processes
provide the lower bound on the entropy change, ∆S T D = 0. This centrality of quasi-static
processes will be important when we turn to the reduction of the TDSL, which is the topic of
the next section.
5 Turning to statistical mechanics
Having outlined the TDSL and processes in TD we turn to the reductive project: what is the
reductive basis of the TDSL in SM? Finding the distinction between heat and work in SM is at
best complicated (cf. Maroney (2007), Prunkl (2018)) and at worst ‘unnatural’ (Knox 2016, p.
56) or ‘anthropocentric’ (Myrvold 2011).16 Consequently, the Kelvin formulation does not
have an obvious correlate in SM. Indeed, cyclic processes and Carnot engines do not have a
starring role in SM, unlike TD. Transferring heat between bodies of different temperatures is
not the main concern of SM either. Instead, non-equilibrium SM is concerned with
qualitatively describing the approach to equilibrium. And equilibrium SM calculates various
macroscopic quantities from the canonical probability distribution (and the partition function
Z plays a starring role). As such, the focus of SM differs slightly from that of TD.
Thus, a natural way to connect these two subject matters in order to find the reductive basis
of the TDSL within SM is this: the TDSL has the implication that S T D cannot decrease (for a
thermally isolated system). Hence, finding the SM realiser of S T D is key to finding the
paper, since it is far from clear that the requisite quasi-static processes are available in the
‘formation of a thought’.
16Maxwell claimed the distinction between heat and work is one of disordered and ordered
motion, which ‘is not a property of material things in themselves, but only in relation to the
mind which perceives them’ (Maxwell 1878, p. 221); (Niven 1965, p. 646) as quoted in
Myrvold (2011).
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reductive basis of the TDSL in SM. Indeed, Callender (1999) calls this the search for the ‘the
holy grail’: find a SM function to call ‘entropy’ and establish that it is non-decreasing.
But I think that role of S T D as defined by this holy grail does not capture the right features
of the TDSL: I now argue that ‘being a non-decreasing SM function’ is not the right functional
role for S T D. Defining the functional role as ‘non-decreasing’ is in some respects too weak,
and in other respects too strong. In the next section I emphasis how the reductive project at
hand — the reduction of the TDSL — differs from the reduction of the minus first law. Then,
in section 5.2, I criticise the old grail, and in doing so emphasise the essential features of the
TDSL that lead to the correct functional role: the new grail.
5.1 The reductive project here
There is a feature about the TDSL that is important to emphasise for the reductive project at
hand: the distinction between the second law and the minus first law. The spontaneous
approach to equilibrium (from non-equilibrium) is distinct from the second law, which
describes the thermodynamic entropy differences between equilibrium states. It is a
presupposition of TD that systems do in fact reach a unique state of equilibrium, as discussed
in section 3.1: this is the minus first law. Once the system reaches equilibrium then, by
definition, it will not change — unless there is an intervention on an external parameter.
To emphasis the contrast: the second law tells us that certain interventions render the initial
state irrecoverable, where as the minus first law tells us that systems spontaneously reach a
state of equilibrium.
Finding the microphysical ‘underpinning’ for these two laws are distinct projects (cf.
Luczak (2018)). The H-theorem and coarse-graining approaches in SM are concerned with
quantitatively describing the approach to equilibrium. These foundational projects are
concerned with establishing the circumstances under which a given system will approach
equilibrium, rather than the quasi-static interventions on equilibrium states. That is, they are
concerned with the underpinning of the minus first law, rather than the second law.
Of course, since equilibrium states are central to TD and the minus first law is baked deep
into the nature of quasi-static processes, the two projects are connected (as we will see later).
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But the crucial point to emphasise here is that even if we resolve the controversy around the
underpinning of the minus first law, there is still a further project to find the underpinning of
the second law. This project is rarely discussed but this is what is required to have a reduction
of the TDSL.17 And this isn’t just nitpicking over the names of laws: the types of
irreversibility captured by the minus first and second law differ. The minus first law is
concerned with the more familiar type of irreversibility —non-TRI— exemplified in the
spontaneous approach to equilibrium. But as we saw in section 3, the nature of processes in
TD differs from this familiar spontaneous evolution: interventions and quasi-static processes
are key.
5.2 Out with the old, in with the new: the search for the holy grail
I first describe why the old grail is too strong, and then discuss why it is too weak — before
outlining the new grail.
The old grail claims that the SM realiser must be ‘non-decreasing’, but this is too strong:
S T D can decrease when the system is not thermally isolated from its environment. The state of
the environment was key to the definition of irrecoverability, and the environment is a key
feature of the TDSL. For example, it is important to emphasise the ‘sole effect’ part of the
Clausius statement: otherwise, fridges would be a clear counterexample to the TDSL. Fridges
transport heat from a colder to hotter body — at a cost. Such transport is only prohibited as
the sole effect. Likewise, in section 4, we showed that the entropy S T D of the system is only
non-decreasing during adiabatic (i.e. thermally isolated) processes. Indeed, during an
isothermal compression from C to D, the entropy of the system decreases. This is especially
obvious when we view the Carnot cycle in the T -S plane, as shown in Figure 6. Of course,
during an isothermal compression heat flows to the heat bath, i.e. the environment, and so
during this process the net entropy change ∆S T D is zero.
Here it is clear how central the system and environment split is in thermodynamics. We can
17One notable is Gibbs’ 1902 textbook where he discusses the SM analogues of TD
processes such as the Carnot cycle, (Gibbs 1902, Ch. XIII). But to Gibbs’ eyes these are mere
analogues rather than reductions, a point endorsed by Batterman (2010).
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naturally take the original system and heat bath together as ‘the system’. If this system is
thermally isolated from all other systems, then the Carnot cycle is an adiabatic quasi-static
process and the entropy change is zero — as expected. In this way, we might think that
adiabatic processes are more foundational than isothermal processes. Henceforth, we will
mainly consider thermally isolated systems (and so adiabatic processes), and return to heat in
section 6.4.
Figure 6: The Carnot Cycle represented in the T-S plane.
There is a second reason to think that the old grail — that the SM realiser must be
non-decreasing — is too strong. From the outset I have emphasised that equilibrium is central
to TD. Indeed, S T D is only defined at equilibrium: it is silent about what happens away from
equilibrium. And in this way the old grail too strong: if the SM entropy decreases away from
equilibrium, this needn’t be problematic. A decreasing SM entropy only conflicts with the
TDSL if it decreases between isolated equilibrium states.
An importance consequence of the second law is the irrecoverability which it legislates; the
signature of irrecoverability is often taken to be the increase of thermodynamic entropy (in a
thermally isolated system). This highlights a way in which the old grail is too weak —
‘non-decreasing’ does not suffice to capture the right role because the realiser of the S T D must
increase in the right situations too. As such, the traditional holy grail — a non-decreasing
function — does not suffice: a realiser of S T D must also increase in the right situations —
during non-quasi-static adiabatic processes.
Thus, the old grail does not capture the right role: ‘non-decreasing SM entropy’ is not the
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right desiderata for microphysical realiser of the TDSL. But through criticising it we have
considered the key features of the TDSL: the importance of quasi-static processes, the
environment and the distinction between the minus first and second law. Thus, we are now in
a position to state the correct functional role: the new grail.
The new grail: find a SM realiser which, for thermally isolated systems, is increasing in
non-quasi-static processes, but non-increasing in quasi-static processes, such as those
represented by curves in Ξ.
Next, in section 6, I show how the realiser can be found in statistical mechanics (SM). I
show how quasi-static processes can be modelled in SM, and then show how the Gibbs
entropy plays the right ‘new grail’ role.
But, whilst part of daily workhorse of SM, the Gibbs entropy is unpopular in the
foundational literature. The main complaint is that the Gibbs entropy is ‘an ensemble
property’, rather than a property of the individual system. (This often frequently motivates a
Boltzmannian approach to SM, instead of a Gibbsian one, cf. Callender (1999; 2001)). In
section 7, I quell some of these worries about the Gibbsian approach, and defend the Gibbs
entropy, S G. However, this defence will not involve any criticism of the Boltzmannian entropy
S B — I leave it as a challenge to the neo-Boltzmannian to show that S B can play the S T D role
as well as S G does.18
6 Searching for the new grail in SM
The realiser of S T D needs to behave differently in quasi-static and non-quasi-static processes.
In this section I discuss how the distinction between slow, quasi-static processes and rapid,
non-quasi-static processes can be made in SM.
18As such, I am leaving open the possibility that there is more than one realiser of the S T D
role. That is, the S T D may be multiply realised - a view endorsed by Sklar (1999) and Wilson
(1985). Whether multiple realisability is worrisome depends on issues in the metaphysics of
properties, so I leave it to one side here.
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SM is an umbrella term for classical SM (CSM) and quantum SM (QSM). Whilst the story
I tell in this section runs in parallel for QSM and CSM, I focus on the QSM framework for
two reasons: firstly, since quantum mechanics is considered to be the correct theory (to which
classical mechanics is an approximation), QSM should be the priority (and happily, the key
principle required for this section is less contentious in the quantum case than the classical
case). Secondly, my focus on QSM over CSM in this section foreshadows my later argument
(in section 7) that certain problems can be resolved (or dissolved) by considering the quantum
rather than the classical.
In section 6.1, I first consider how interventions on external parameters influence the state
of the system. Furthermore, I will demonstrate how, for thermally isolated systems, the Gibbs
entropy S G is constant in quasi-static processes (section 6.2), but increases in non-quasi-static
processes (section 6.3) — and thus S G can play the right role. In section 6.4 I will connect my
claims about S G back to heat.
6.1 Interventions in QSM
In QSM, like CSM, thermal equilibrium is represented by the canonically distributed state:
ρcan = Σiwi |Ei〉 〈Ei| (6.1)
where
wi =
e−βEi
Z
, (6.2)
where Z is the partition function. Whilst in CSM, ρcan is a probability density distribution over
the phase space Γ, in QSM ρcan is a density matrix.19 ρcan is a statistical mixture of energy
eigenstates, where the probability of being a given energy |E j〉 depends exponentially on the
eigenvalue E j of that state, and the temperature β = kBT , where kB is Boltzmann’s constant.
Maroney (2007) gives an elegant justification for why ρcan represents thermal equilibrium
19In QM, the density matrix ρ = |Ψ〉 〈Ψ| is a more general object than the wavefunction Ψ,
since it represents all that the wavefunction can and more – it can also represent statistical
mixtures, cf. Sakurai and Commins (1995), Landau and Lifshitz (1964).
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states familiar from thermodynamics20, but here it will suffice to note two features:
1. The unitary evolution of a density matrix is given by the Liouville-von Neumann
equation:
ih¯
∂ρ
∂t
= [H, ρ] (6.3)
Since ρcan commutes with the time-independent H, it is unchanging in time:
dρcan
dt
= 0. (6.4)
2. The canonical ensemble (at a given total energy and temperature) maximises the Gibbs
entropy:
S G = −kBTrρlnρ (6.5)
which is the quantum analogue of the classical Gibbs entropy:
S G = −kB
∫
dqdpρ(q, p)lnρ(q, p). (6.6)
At t0, let us start with the system in the canonical ensemble, ρcan, where the Hamiltonian,
H(t0) is time-independent. When there is an intervention on an external parameter V in the
period t0 < t < t1, the Hamiltonian will be time-dependent. At t1, the parameter V has a new
value V1, and the Hamiltonian is once again time-independent.
For example, let us consider changing the volume of the box. The external parameter, V ,
determines the potential energy:
Ubox(xi, yi, zi)) =

0 if 0 < xi < x(t), 0 < yi < Ly, 0 < zi < Lz
+∞ otherwise
Changing an external parameter, like the volume of the box, changes H(V(t)). At the
20Here I am clearly working with Gibbsian SM. In the Boltzmannian picture, equilibrium is
represented by the largest macrostate in phase space (or as Werndl and Frigg (2015a;b)
suggest the state that the system spends the most time in).
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beginning t0, H(V0), and end of the process t1, H(V1), the Hamiltonian is time-independent.
When t0 < t < t1, the Hamiltonian is changing.
The energy eigenstates |Ei〉 in equation 6.1 are eigenstates of the initial Hamiltonian H(V0),
and so are unchanging in time. In the period, t0 < t < t1, each eigenstate |Ei〉 evolves to a new
state |Ψ(t)〉, which is written in this general form to emphasise that |Ψ(t)〉 might not be an
eigenstate of the new Hamiltonian, and furthermore, is changing in time.
In the next two sections, I consider how the state of the system changes during the
intervention in t0 < t < t1, and what the state at t1 will be. In particular, we need to show that:
• If the change to the external parameter is quasi-static (i.e. t1 − t0 → ∞) then S G is
constant: I do this in section 6.2.
• But if the intervention is non-quasi-static then S G increases: I do this in section 6.3.
6.2 Quasi-static changes
In thermodynamics, a quasi-static process requires that the systems is very close to
equilibrium at every stage. In QSM, this translates as the requirement that system is
approximately canonically distributed, whilst an external parameter is altered very slowly.
One heuristic for thinking about this: each pure state (which is initially an energy eigenstate
of H(t0)) in the statistical mixture ρcan(t0) evolves under the time-dependent Schrödinger
equation, carrying its original weighting wi with it.
The key issue is why think that ρ(t) will still be canonical under this evolution? For ρ(t) to
be canonical at any given time, it needs to be:
1. a statistical mixture of eigenstates of H(t), whilst H changes in the period t0 < t < t1.
2. whose probability depends on the new energy eigenstate, Ei.
1. is ensured by a theorem, known variously as Ehrenfest’s principle, or the quantum adiabatic
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theorem21 (cf. Griffiths and Schroeter (2018, Ch. 10), Messiah (1962, Ch. 17).22
Ehrenfest’s principle: If the energy eigenstates of H(t) are non degenerate for times
t > t1, if |Ei(t1)〉 is an energy eigenstate of H(t1), if |Ei(t)〉 is the state evolved from
|Ei(t1)〉 according to the Schrödinger equation, and if the external parameter changes very
slowly, then |Ei(t)〉, for each time t > t1, is very nearly an energy eigenstate of H(t) at the
corresponding time. In the mathematical limit of a finite change in the external parameter
occurring over an infinite time interval, ‘is very nearly’ becomes ‘is’ (Baierlein 1971, p.
380).
Why should we think that the conditions of Ehrenfest’s principle hold? Infinite time limits
are contentious (cf. Palacios (2018)), and of course, only ‘approximately’ hold in real life
situations. But, just like in the thermodynamic situation, an intervention is smooth and ‘slow
enough’ if t1 − t0 is larger than the characteristic timescale of the particular system in question
21For our purposes, neither name is ideal. ‘Adiabatic’ here means ‘very slow’ rather than its
usual TD meaning, and ‘Ehrenfest’s principle’ may be confused with Ehrenfest’s theorem,
which relates the expectation value of position and momentum, and is related to the
quantum-classical correspondence principle.
22There is an analog of the quantum adiabatic theorem in classical mechanics. In CM, a
slow change to an external parameter (such as the length of a pendulum), cf. (Arnold 2010, p.
298), is called an adiabatic change (beware the different meaning of ‘adiabatic’ than in TD!).
A property of a system that stays approximately constant when changes occur sufficiently
slowly is called an adiabatic invariant. Rugh (2001) shows that under an ergodic hypothesis
the entropy is an adiabatic invariant. Whilst these ideas date back to Hertz (1910), they are far
less established than Ehrenfest’s quantum adiabatic theorem. Furthermore, they depend on
two contentious issues: (i) the ergodic hypothesis (which is hard to show holds of many
realistic systems, cf. Earman and Rédei (1996)) and (ii) the nature of CSM probability: if one
takes a Jaynesian approach, such dynamical considerations about changes in the Hamiltonian
need to be connected to our knowledge (I will return to this latter issue about probability in
CSM in section 7).
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Figure 7: The graph on the left shows the canonical distribution at t0, and the graph on the right
shows the system approximately in the canonical distribution at the later time, diagram drawn
following (Baierlein 1971, p. 380), depicting only six of the many states.
(see Messiah (1999) for more details).23
If Ehrenfest’s principle applies, earlier eigenstates |Ei(t0)〉 will be taken to new energy
eigenstates, |E′i (t1)〉. Furthermore, if there is no degeneracy, then there will be no ‘crossings’
of the lines in Figure 7, and so the distribution is monotonically decreasing.24 Thus, a
radically different distribution (such as a Gaussian distribution) is not possible, since for such
a radical difference, the eigenstates would need to cross (i.e. the originally highest probability
lowest energy eigenstate must be shifted to the peak of the Gaussian distribution).
But even if Ehrenfest’s principle ensures that the distribution will remain monotonically
decreasing, there remains the question: is it canonically distributed – that is, is there an
exponential dependence of the probability wi on the energy eigenvalue, Ei?
Yes, provided that the energy eigenvalues of H(t0) and H(t) are related in a particular way.
23In the case of a gas, the characteristic timescale is related to the mean free path: how far,
on average, a given molecule travels before colliding. Baierlein gives the following suggestion
for getting a handle on the timescale of ‘fast’: ‘let us suppose that the piston is pulled out
extremely rapidly, specifically, much faster than the speed of sound in the originally quiescent
gas’ (Baierlein 1971, p. 408).
24The assumption that the energy eigenstates are non-degenerate is contentious, especially
for large systems. But the common justification is that any small perturbation will lift the
degeneracy, cf. Tong (2012).
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That is, if equation 6.7 holds for all i:
Ei(V(t)) = f (t).Ei(V(t0)) (6.7)
At t0,
e
− Ei(V(t0))kT (t0) , (6.8)
which we can re-write in terms of equation 6.7
e
− Ei(V(t))kT (t0). f (t)) . (6.9)
Thus, if the temperature at t is a scaling of the earlier temperature: T (t) = f (t).T (t0), then
we have a new canonical distribution:
e−
Ei(V(t))
kT (t) . (6.10)
Thus, if the change to the external parameter is slow (i.e. quasi-static) and equation 6.7
holds, then the system will remain (close to) the canonical ensemble, with a varying
temperature. Equation 6.7 has been shown to hold for a realistic gas (Katz 1967, p. 84-90),
and the hope is that this result will generalise (Baierlein 1971, p. 380).25
Thus, we can model quasi-static processes in the QSM. But what of the Gibbs entropy
S G(ρ)? How does S G change during such a process? Here the answer is immediate:
∆S G = 0, (6.11)
since the evolution is unitary (see Baierlein (1971, p. 379) for an extended discussion). This
unchanging nature of S G is wholly unsurprising, since the traditional problem with the Gibbs
entropy is working out how it can increase — which is part of the project of the next section.
25This assumption is widespread, see (Wallace 2014, p. 714). Furthermore, Baierlein argues
that assuming that equation 6.7 holds is reasonable: the new temperature T (t) is determined
from the proven constancy of S G (Baierlein 1971, p. 384).
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6.3 Rapid changes
If the change of the external parameter from V0 to V1 is rapid, then Ehrenfest’s principle does
not apply. In particular, re-writing the state of the system in terms of the later energy
eigenbasis of H(V1) (which we denote |E′i (t1)〉) we see that ρ is not diagonal in this basis:
ρ(t) = Σi jωi j |E′i (t)〉 〈E′j(t)| (6.12)
Consequently, if t1 − t0 ≈ 0, the system will not be in a statistical mixture of energy
eigenstates of H(V1), and so will not in the canonical distributed state that represents thermal
equilibrium. Thus, during the rapid change to the external parameter, the system is not even
approximately canonically distributed. But what happens next, i.e. when t >> t1?
In thermodynamics, we just assume that the system will settle down to a new equilibrium
(the minus first law). In SM, there is a similar pragmatic move, which I consider first
following Baierlein (1971), before seeking to justify it.
The pragmatic move: is just to adopt a new canonical distribution with energy eigenstates
appropriate for the new volume, V1. In other words, we coarse-grain:
ρ(t) = Σi jωi j |Ei(t)〉 〈E j(t)| → Σiωii |Ei(t)〉 〈Ei(t)| , (6.13)
where we assume that the off-diagonal terms wi j, i , j are small so
Σi jωi j |Ei(t)〉 〈E j(t)| ≈ Σiωii |Ei(t)〉 〈Ei(t)| , (6.14)
where t is a long time after the external parameter has stopped changing. Since we have
coarse-grained, we expect
S G[ρcan(t1)] − S G[ρcan(t0)] > 0. (6.15)
Within TD, the assumption that, after a while (i.e. when t >> t1), systems settle down to a
new equilibrium state has no justification, beyond the claim that this is indeed how many
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systems in fact behave. But since SM goes beyond TD, we might hope it can do better.
The justification: Rather than just assuming that systems settle to a new equilibrium, the
business of non-equilibrium SM is to quantitatively describe the approach to equilibrium. For
example, Boltzmann’s equation tells you how quickly a gas will settle down to the
Maxwell-Boltzmann distribution.
Yet non-equilibrium statistical mechanics is riddled with controversy — and there are many
different schools of thought. Should we justify the approach to equilibrium using Boltzmann’s
combinatoric reasoning (Albert 2000), the H-theorem (Brown et al. 2009), coarse-graining
(Jancel 2013, Prigogine 1980, Prigogine and Stengers 1984)’s non-unitary dynamics, or some
other framework? Here we enter a quagmire. But there’s one saving grace for our concerns
here: according to all approaches, the SM entropy increases in the approach to equilibrium
from non-equilibrium.
But in what follows, I justify the pragmatic move above in terms of my preferred approach
to SM: the ZZW coarse-graining framework (cf. Zwanzig (1960), Zeh (2007), Wallace
(2011)), which applies to both QM and CM (see Wallace (2016)).
In equation 6.13, the full density matrix ρ evolved from ρcan(t0) is replaced by a
coarse-graining ρcan(t1) corresponding to a new equilibrium. Many worry this amounts to
replacing the true distribution with a distorted distribution (Grünbaum 1973, Redhead 1996,
Denbigh and Denbigh 1985). But coarse-graining is not a form of distortion, but rather
irrelevant details are thrown away – and so this is a case of abstraction. (See Robertson (2019)
for more details, and Myrvold (2014) for a similar line).
More importantly, coarse-graining is used in the ZZW framework to construct the
empirically successful irreversible equations that, inter alia, describe the approach to
equilibrium. By banning coarse-graining, we would lose these empirically successful
equations. Of course, finding an appropriate coarse-graining is hard, and depends on the
details of the system at hand and particular initial conditions. But where successful, we can
show that the details shown away are truly irrelevant for the future evolution of the system
(over timescales less than the recurrence time, see Wallace (2011) for more details on when
the discarded details are truly irrelevant).
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Nonetheless, to reiterate, regardless of whether you endorse the ZZW framework, all
schools of non-equilibrium SM agree that the SM entropy increases in the approach to
equilibrium. Thus, we have achieved our goal: S G increases in rapid, non-quasi-static
adiabatic processes, but is constant in quasi-static processes.
Thus, I conclude (in agreement with Maroney (2007)): S G is the realiser of S T D since it
plays the right role — and so the TDSL is reduced to SM.
The conceptual hard work is done, but now we can enjoy a corollary of this approach: we
can connect the discussion back to heat, and so come full circle.
6.4 Heat and the Gibbs entropy
In thermodynamics, the relationship between heat Q and entropy S T D is:
dS T D =
d¯Q
TT D
(6.16)
(Throughout this section, I will use the subscript T D to make clear that these quantities are
defined in thermodynamics.) The first law of thermodynamics states that dET D =d¯Q+d¯W,
and so
dS T D =
1
TT D
(dET D + pT DdV) (6.17)
In Gibbsian QSM, we find this relationship between heat and entropy as follows.
S G(ρcan) − kBΣi pilnpi = −kB(β〈E〉+ lnZ) (6.18)
If the external parameter V is changed slowly enough that the system remains in the canonical
distribution, then the differential form is:
dS G = k(dβ〈E〉+ βd〈E〉+ ∂lnZ
∂β
∂β+
∂lnZ
∂V
dV) (6.19)
=
1
T
(d〈E〉+ 〈p〉dV) (6.20)
Since equation 6.20 and equation 6.17 represent the same functional interdependencies, S G
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bears the right relation to ‘heat’. Of course, much more could be said about heat and work in
QSM: here, I direct the reader to Prunkl (2018), Maroney (2007).
There is one obvious difference between equation 6.20 and 6.17: in QSM, we are dealing
with expectation values. In the next section I consider the vexed issue of probability and the
associated objections to S G. But here note that discussing expectation values is not a
detraction to this account. The variance from the mean can be calculated, and this gives us
useful information about fluctuations (Wallace 2015). Here SM goes beyond TD, and so is the
successor theory to TD.
A successor theory often limits the domain — or scope — of the older theory, and this is the
case with TD. Since Maxwell (1891), all hands admit that the TDSL can be violated.26 But
nonetheless the TDSL seems to capture something true about our world; greater-than-Carnot
efficiency engines are hardly a dime a dozen.27 Thus, the key issue is to establish under what
circumstances the TDSL can be violated, and then restrict the scope of TDSL to exclude those
circumstances. Here the orthodoxy is that the TDSL must be weaken to a probabilistic
statement, at the very least.28 Fluctuation phenomena imply that heat can spontaneously flow
from colder to hotter bodies (with no other effect), but on average there will be no net such
flow. Thus, a weakening the TDSL to a probabilistic version, as reflected in the use of
expectation values in SM, is appropriate.
Thus, I conclude that the Gibbs entropy can play the right role, since it increases in
non-quasi-static processes but is constant in quasi-static processes. Furthermore, S G is
connected to heat in the right way, and the presence of expectation values is a feature, not a
26The idea that the TDSL is not a strict law was suggested by Maxwell: ‘Hence the TDSL
is continually being violated, and that to a considerable extent, in any sufficiently small group
of molecules belonging to a real body ’ Maxwell (1891) as quoted by Cercignani (1998).
27And if there were even an glimmer of hope that a greater-than-Carnot engine is possible,
it would be a hive of research, since it would help us solve the energy crisis.
28There are more severe possible restrictions in its scope. For example, the Maxwellian
view discussed by Myrvold (2011), restricts the TDSL to suitably ‘large’ systems. But see
Linden et al. (2010) for a discussion of the smallest possible thermal systems. Here I leave
aside the interesting questions about the size and type of systems that TD applies to.
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bug.
7 Defending the Gibbs entropy
In philosophical circles, the Gibbs entropy far more unpopular than its cousin, the Boltzmann
entropy.29 The main objection to the Gibbs entropy is that it is a property of an ensemble,
rather than an individual system. S G is a function of the canonical distribution, commonly
known as the canonical ensemble. In CSM, the canonical ensemble is a probability measure
over the 6N phase space of possible states, which is understood to represent how many
members of the imaginary infinite ensemble have that state. This breeds puzzlement. Why
should an infinite ensemble—and, furthermore, one that is imaginary—be helpful? And how
on earth is it connected to the individual system whose thermodynamic entropy can be
measured in the laboratory?
But the ‘infinite imaginary ensemble’ can be demystified. It is just a vivid way to give the
probabilities in SM a frequency interpretation. (For a canonical example of this frequentist
understanding of SM probabilities, see Gibbs (1902, p. 5)). The probability of a given state is
just the number of (imaginary) systems in that state. But there are many other positions in the
philosophy of probability aside from frequentism. Thus, the canonical ensemble is just a
probability distribution which needn’t be given this imaginary ensemble interpretation.
As such, the ensemble worry is not strictly about ensembles, but rather about probability in
SM. In particular, the concern is the S G is not a property of the possessed microstate of the
system but a property of a probability distribution over possible microstates. (However, to fit
with the rest of the literature, I will continue to call this objection ‘the ensemble worry’, but in
what follows ‘ensemble property’ is used interchangably with ‘property of a probability
distribution’.)
Why worry that S G is a property of a probability distribution rather than a microstate? In
29I call them cousins, since they are related to one another. In particular, each can be
derived from the other, despite conceptual differences (see Frigg and Werndl (2011) for more
details on this, and Wallace (2018) for an argument that Boltzmannian SM is a special case of,
rather than an alternative to, Gibbsian SM).
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section 7.1, I defuse a common but ill-motivated answer: that there is a mismatch with S T D.
In section 7.2, I then give a better reason to be concerned: if S G depends not only on the
microstate, then in CSM, it depends on something else. I discuss how this can affect the status
of S G — in particular, S G may consequently appear anthropocentric. But, as I will argue in
section 7.3, the situation is radically different in the quantum setting: the ‘ensemble vs
individual’ property problem does not even arise, and there is no reason to think that S G is
anthropocentric.
7.1 A bad objection: mismatches
Why should the ‘ensemble nature’ of the Gibbs entropy worry us? As Callender (2001)
emphasises, S T D is a feature of the individual system, and so S G does not match S T D. In
contrast, the Boltzmann entropy S B = kBlnΩ is a property of the individual system. Thus,
Boltzmannians (cf. Callender (1999; 2001), Goldstein and Lebowitz (2004), Frigg (2010))
claim that S B is superior, since it is a function of the microstate of the system.30
As such, there is a mismatch between S G and S T D. Yet this mismatch is a bad reason to
worry about the ensemble nature of S G. Mismatches are not problematic solely in virtue of
revealing differences between the higher and lower-level quantities. As discussed in section 2,
the higher-level quantities Xt need not always exactly match the lower-level quantities Xb.31
S G is not bad merely in virtue of not matching S T D exactly. According to functionalism,
differences between quantities are not instantly a problem that blocks reduction. Provided S G
plays the role of S T D, then other differences are tolerated. Such as, if ‘being a property of the
30Note however that S B is a modal property: it depends on the number of microstates within
the macrostate partition, and as such it measures the number of microstates the system could
have been in, but actually isn’t, whilst still having the same macroproperties.
31Indeed, given the two concepts are embedded in distinct theories, some differences are to
be expected. Two theories will inevitably employ different concepts. They are different
theories, after all. Furthermore, in order to secure a reduction, the lower-level theories’
quantities must only capture the relevant, or crucial, features of the higher-level theories
quantities.
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individual system’ or ‘being non-probabilistic’ is not part of the essential role of S T D, then the
ensemble nature of the Gibbs entropy is not worrying.
As discussed in section 2, the realiser can differ in ways that do not affect its playing the
functional role. Being an ensemble property doesn’t seem to prevent S G playing the S T D role
(for isolated systems, increasing in non-quasi-static processes, but remaining constant in
quasi-static processes).
Of course, those who levy the ensemble objection against S G can just reply that the
functional role of S T D is as I’ve defined in terms of quasi-static processes plus the requirement
that it is a property of the individual system. However, I see no reason to alter the functional
role in this way. The role I’ve defended required careful consideration of the nature of
processes in TD, the minus first law and the types of irreversibility. Thus, the onus is on
‘ensemble objector’ to say why ‘being a property of an individual system’ is an integral part of
TD in particular, rather than a general suspicion of mismatches and probabilities (which after
all, form a large part of the scientific enterprise, even if they are philosophically contentious).
7.2 A better objection: the nature of probability in CSM
Indeed, it is the philosophical issues with probabilities that provide a better reason to be
worried that the Gibbs entropy is a function of ρ, a probability distribution over possible
microstates. In CSM, since S G is not just a property of the microstate of the system, it
depends on something extra outside of the system too. What this ‘something extra’ is depends
on your interpretation of the CSM probabilities. In the case of the ensemble interpretation, S G
depends not only on the state of the individual system but also on the other members of the
ensemble. Thus, S G seems like a mysterious quantity. Of course, earlier I claimed that ρ
needn’t be given a frequentist interpretation in terms of an imagined ensemble. Shorn of this
ensemble gloss, we might prefer a different view of probability — but none of the available
options render S G a full-blooded anthropocentrism-free quantity.
Jaynes, for instance, thought that ρ represented our ignorance of the system’s exact
microstate. Here, the probability distribution ρ depends not only on the state of the system but
on our epistemic situation. If the probability distribution depends on our ignorance, then if we
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were to learn the exact microstate of the system, we would assign probability 1 to this state —
and, since ln1 = 0, the Gibbs entropy would vanish! Thus, it would seem the Gibbs entropy is
to do with what is going on inside our heads — rather than a bona fide feature of reality
independent of us.32 On this interpretation, the Gibbs entropy is thoroughly anthropocentric; a
mirage stemming our ignorance.
But whilst Jaynes’ view is popular, it is important to flag that ρ needn’t be given a
subjective interpretation following Jaynes (1957), since CSM probabilities can be considered
to be ‘almost objective’ following Myrvold (2012), whose work is in the spirit of the
‘objectified credences’ tradition, cf. Poincaré (1896). Here the dynamics play a crucial role by
washing out differences in our initial credences, such that there is intersubjective agreement
about the right probability distribution to assign to the system. Thus, unlike the Jaynesian
view, on this interpretation of CSM probability, S G is not just ‘in our heads’. Yet moving from
the actual microstate of the system (given by the underlying dynamical theory CM) to a
probability distribution assigned by CSM, requires an additional ingredient, credence. Since
this is a hybrid view that mixes epistemic and ontic considerations, a vestigial tail of
anthropocentrism remains.
Naturally, interpreting probabilities in SM is a large project, especially justifying Gibbs
phase averaging (Malament and Zabell 1980). Not only is the project large, it is also pressing
given the indispensability of probabilities in SM (cf. Wallace (2015; 2018)). However, lack of
space is not the only reason why I won’t dwell further on the issues with probability in CSM
here: the main reason is that understanding probability in SM in completely transformed in
the (foundationally more important) quantum context (Wallace 2016). Crucially for our
discussion, the ensemble objection does not even get off the ground in the QSM context.
7.3 Quantum of solace
In CSM, there is a gap between the possessed microstate of the system and ρ, which opens the
door to claims that S G is mysterious, or anthropocentric. But in QSM there is no such gap
32In this way, a Jaynesian view of SM probability seems incompatible with standard
scientific realism that requires our scientific descriptions be mind-independent.
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between the ‘microstate’ of the system and ρ — and thus, no room for ignorance, credence or
anthropocentrism to sneak in. There is no analogous ‘gap’ in QSM because the underlying
microdynamics, QM, is already probabilistic. Furthermore, as I will now argue, there is no
distinction between the ‘microstate’ of the system and a probability distribution over these
microstates: both are density matrices. And consequently, the distinction between a property
of a probability distribution (an ‘ensemble property’) or a property of the individual system
does not arise in the first place.
The density matrix is arguably the best mathematical object to represent the state of the
individual system (rather than the wavefunction ψ), since ρˆ is a more general object than ψ.
Quantum systems rapidly become entangled with their environment — which means that the
individual system cannot be described by a wavefunction, but instead must be a (reduced)
density matrix (by tracing over the environment). Since the density matrix formalism is more
general, and sometimes required, the density matrix should be taken to be more fundamental.
(See Wallace and Timpson (2010), Wallace (2011), Chen (2018) and Maroney for more on
this point). Thus the individual state of the system in QM is not represented by a ray in Hilbert
space (the quantum equivalent of a point in phase space), but a density matrix.
A probability distribution over these ‘fundamental microstates’ of QM, density matrices,
just gives...another density matrix! Furthermore, we should not be misled: ρ is not
straightforwardly a probability distribution over states, one of which the system is ‘really in’,
because ρ is degenerate: the same ρ can represent distinct probability distributions over
different (even incompatible) pure states, see Hughes (1989). (See Popescu et al. (2006) for a
discussion of how the density matrix ρcan representing the canonically distributed state can be
derived — free from any claims about ignorance). Thus, there is no difference in the
mathematical object that represents the state of the individual system, and a probability
distribution over it. Thus, in QSM, the dichotomy between ‘being a property of a probability
distribution’ and ‘being a property of the individual system’ never arises.
Whilst this removes the dichotomy upon which the ‘ensemble worry’ about S G rests,
insofar as this topic stemmed from the mystery mongering about probability in SM, there is
bad news. Understanding the nature of probability in QSM any further involves tangling with
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the quantum measurement problem, since the status of probability in QM is
interpretation-dependent. And so in this way, we are out of the frying pan but into the fire.
One consolation: taking QSM rather than CSM as the conceptual starting point not only
defuses the ensemble worry, it also removes one of Sklar (1999)’s concerns about the
reduction of TD. In the classical case, probabilities are a new conceptual ingredient that have
to be added to the microdynamics in order to construct CSM and so find the regularities of
TD. Sklar is concerned that probability is a new, autonomous posit33, and so may spell trouble
for reduction because too much has been bundled into the bridge laws.34 Regardless of
whether we share Sklar’s worry that we may be helping ourselves to ‘too much’, note that the
problem does not arise in QSM. Probability is already inherent in the ‘microdynamics’, and so
is not a new ingredient (cf. (Wallace 2016, p. 6)).
To sum up: Gibbsian SM can be shorn of the ensemble metaphor, which just indicates a
frequentist interpretation of the probability in SM. But the popular Jaynesian alternative
makes probabilities a reflection of our ignorance, and consequently endangers taking S G to be
subjective. Even objective interpretations of CSM probabilities create a distance between
being a possessed property of the system, and a property of a probability distribution. This
problem does not arise in QSM, since a density matrix such as ρcan can be considered the
fundamental ‘microstate’ description of the system, and thus the ‘ensemble vs individual
system’ objection does not get off the ground in QSM.
33‘It is, in fact, the status of these probabilistic assumptions, central to the theory and
possibly not importable into it from other physical theories, that is the most problematic
element when one asks whether we ought to claim a reductive relationship between
thermodynamics and statistical mechanics’ (Sklar 1999, p. 190) emphasis added.
34Sklar is concerned that if we are too liberal with what is allowed in a bridge law, the
reduction is trivialised. However see Uffink (1996) for a robust reply to this issue on bridge
laws. Briefly, in practice no matter how many conceptual resources we help ourselves to
performing a reduction in a particular case study is tricky — and far from trivial!
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8 Conclusion
Because of the different concepts — most importantly heat and work — in thermodynamics,
finding a statistical mechanical correlate to the classic formulations of the second law is not
straightforward. The traditional approach is to try to find a non-decreasing entropy function:
what Callender dubs the search for the holy grail. But I argued that this holy grail is too weak
in some respects, and in other respects too strong: it does not capture the functional role of
S T D. Instead we need the new grail: an SM entropy function that, for thermally isolated
systems, is constant during quasi-static processes and increasing in non-quasi-static processes.
To find the new grail, I took a Gibbsian approach. By using Ehrenfest’s principle, for
thermally isolated systems, we found that the Gibbs entropy is constant during a quasi-static
process, but increases during a non-quasi-static process. Thus, I argued that the Gibbs entropy
plays the requisite role.
I then defended the Gibbs entropy against the objection that it is an ‘ensemble property’
rather than a property of an individual system. The functionalist strategy allows the theory
being reduced to differ (to an extent) from its realiser (reductive base): thus, this mismatch
between S T D and S G is not a problem solely in virtue of being a mismatch. Furthermore,
when we consider the more fundamental theory QSM, rather than CSM, we see that the
dichotomy between being a property of an ensemble or an individual system never arises, thus
removing this main objection to S G.
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